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On Lower-bound Traps: A Framework for the Analysis of Monetary Policy in the 
“Age” of Central Banks 
 
 
Abstract: We present a simple theoretical framework that integrates the notion of the 
natural or neutral interest rate, liquidity preference theory, and the monetary policy 
practice by modern central banks. We claim that this theory explains the conditions under 
which an economy will experience an aggregate demand deficiency problem within a 
modern institutional setting. Contrary to the predictions of the New Consensus View in 
macroeconomics, the model suggests that “structural” factors such as a high saving rate 
and, especially, a low “natural” rate of growth increase the chances that an economy 
experiences an aggregate demand deficiency. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
model predicts that a fall in the NAIRU may lead to a rise in the natural interest rate, and 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
A core proposition in the so-called “New Consensus View” (hereafter NCV) in 
macroeconomics holds that market economies possess strong self-regulation mechanisms 
which guarantee that any expansion of potential output generates an equi-proportional 
increase in the level of aggregate demand so that the latter adjusts passively to the former 
in the long run. The mechanism through which this adjustment process takes place is a 
crucial area of macroeconomic theory, yet it is frequently overlooked. In the Old 
Neoclassical Synthesis, such mechanisms used to come in the form of a real balance 
effect. However, a number of scholars have highlighted its practical irrelevance.
1 We will 
not discuss here the shortcomings of the real balance effect. We wish to note, though, that 
proponents of the NCV resort to another self-regulation mechanism. In particular, they 
assume that the aggregate demand function takes the form  g ar y + − = , where  y  is the 
output gap―the difference between current output and potential output―r  is the real 
interest rate, and g is a stochastic variable with zero mean capturing random shocks to 
aggregate spending, i.e., a shock to exports or fiscal policy (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
1999; Taylor 2000).
2 This aggregate function implicitly poses that whenever a permanent 
shock raises potential output then aggregate demand increases in a similar magnitude. 







                                                 
1 For instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz argue that “quantitatively, it is surely an nth order effect; one 
calculation put it that, even at the fastest rate at which prices fell in the Great Depression, it would take 
more than two centuries to restore the economy to full employment. And in the short run even its sign is 
ambiguous, as inter-temporal substitution effects may (depending on expectations) more than offset the 
wealth effects” (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993). By contrast, Sims (2000) argues that “there is a potential for 
a large real balance effect in a deflationary environment and that its presence makes it extremely unlikely 
that we get into a liquidity trap.” A discussion on the shortcomings of this effect is in Palacio-Vera (2005). 
 
2 A more sophisticated version of this function includes the expected future output gap (see Clarida, Galí, 
and Gertler 1999).  
     4
 
“A permanent rise in productivity raises potential output, but it also raises output demand 
in a perfectly offsetting manner, due to the impact of permanent income. As a consequence, the 
output gap does not change. In turn, there is no change in inflation. Thus, there is no reason to 
raise interest rates, despite the rise in output…This kind of scenario seems to describe well the 
current behaviour of monetary policy [in the U.S. economy]. Output growth was substantially 
above trend in recent times but with no apparent accompanying inflation.” (Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler 1999. Term in brackets added.) 
            
  Apparently, the authors assume that increases in potential output are “perfectly” 
observed by individuals and interpreted as leading to an equivalent rise in expected 
lifetime wealth. In turn, insofar as individuals tend to smooth consumption overtime, the 
expectation of higher expected lifetime wealth leads them to consume more, both in the 
present and in the future. Formally, this assumption amounts to saying that the natural 
interest rate is not affected by changes in the “natural” rate of growth or in potential 
output. However, by resorting to this mechanism, proponents of the NCV tend to assume 
the problem away. Even if we accept that consumption is determined by individuals’ 
wealth, there is still the problem that the level of potential output cannot be observed in 
practice.  
The aggregate demand function presented above also implies that the central bank 
(hereafter CB) offsets stochastic shocks to aggregate spending by manipulating real 
interest rates. This is a fair enough assumption. In this respect, we believe that the most 
salient feature of the institutional framework that characterizes most, if not all, present-
day OECD economies is that the CB fine tunes the economy through changes in short-
term nominal interest rates, which ultimately affect the level of aggregate demand 
through a number of channels. That said, short-term nominal interest rates are subject to a 
zero lower-bound (ZB hereafter). This constraint arises because, in a money using 
economy, individuals will not be willing to hold any financial asset other than money 
when the nominal yield of the former is equal or less than zero. This institutional feature 
was termed by Kaldor (1939) the “great constitutional weakness” of monetary policy 
because it prevents the short-term nominal interest rate from operating equally freely in 
both directions. If we accept the proposition that CBs can and do affect aggregate 
demand by inducing pro-cyclical changes in real interest rates subject to the ZB   5
constraint, then any demonstration of the possibility of the existence of an aggregate 
demand deficiency problem must adopt this institutional setting as the point of departure.  
A core assumption of this study is that the adjustment of aggregate demand to 
potential output in the long run occurs mainly through the impact on aggregate demand of 
investment spending, as well as of conventional monetary policy actions. We define the 
latter as the regular actions that characterize the day-to-day setting of short-term nominal 
interest rates by CBs with a view to achieving an inflation target. Contrary to the NCV, 
we do not believe that permanent shocks to potential output automatically generate 
proportional increases in output so that in the absence of unusually large shocks CBs will 
always be in a position to generate the right level of aggregate demand. Rather, we 
believe that “structural” factors like the saving ratio or the “natural” rate of growth, as 
well as (transitory) demand and supply shocks, may be relevant to explain the emergence 
of an aggregate demand deficiency.      
The main purpose of this study is to integrate in a simple framework the notion of 
the natural or neutral interest rate, liquidity preference theory (hereafter LPT),
3 and the 
stabilizing behavior of modern CBs in order to determine the circumstances under which 
an economy will experience an aggregate demand deficiency problem, i.e., a situation 
where the CB cannot generate a level of aggregate demand that is compatible with price 
stability through the manipulation of interest rates. Central to our theoretical framework 
is the notion of the natural or neutral interest rate (Wicksell 1936[1898]; Cassel 1928), 
which we define as the real interest on loans which is neutral with respect to the inflation 
rate and tends neither to raise nor to lower it in the absence of supply shocks. We wish to 
note that by utilizing the notion of the natural interest rate we do not mean that there is a 
tendency for the interest rate to converge to its natural level, as envisaged in loanable 
funds theory. In any case, we keep the term “natural” as it is standard use in the literature.  
To construct this framework, we develop a model of a closed economy without a 
government sector in which a CB sets (real) interest rates with a view to hitting an 
inflation target. The key element in the analysis is the notion of the lower-bound trap 
(hereafter LBT) on real interest rates, which we define as a scenario in which the CB is 
                                                 
3 Some examples of modern presentations of the notion of LP are the works by Wells (1983), Mott (1985–
86), and especially, Lavoie (1996).  
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unable to push down real interest rates low enough so as to generate either a level of 
aggregate demand equal to potential output or a rate of growth of aggregate spending that 
is equal to the “natural” rate of growth.  
  According to us, the main contributions of this study are the following. First and 
foremost, we provide a simple theoretical framework that integrates the notion of the 
natural or neutral interest rate, LPT, and the praxis of monetary policy by modern CBs 
which allows (or so we believe) a richer and more realistic analysis of the circumstances 
under which an economy will exhibit an aggregate demand deficiency problem. Second, 
and contrary to the proponents of the NCV, we show that a combination of “structural” 
factors, like a high saving rate and a low “natural” rate of growth, as well as short-term or 
transitory shocks, may potentially make an economy experience an aggregate demand 
deficiency problem. Third, an implication of the former result is that we find support for 
those scholars who claim that the Japanese economy has been in a liquidity trap for a 
decade (Krugman 1998; Svensson 2005). In particular, we find support for those authors 
who point to the Japanese high saving rate and low “natural” rate of growth as the most 
likely causes of the recent Japanese stagnation. Fourth, we claim that the NCV model can 
only explain the existence of a liquidity trap by resorting to the occurrence of unusually 
large shocks. To be sure, the NCV aggregate demand function requires that current 
output is always equal to potential output whenever: 1)  0 = g  and 2) r is equal to the 
steady growth interest rate. But, as we argue below, the latter will be the case if the 
economy is not in a LBT and, in turn, this will only occur if the sum of the natural 
interest rate and the inflation rate exceeds the term premium. We show that this will be 
the less likely the higher the saving rate and the lower the “natural” rate of growth. Fifth, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a rise (fall) in the NAIRU may lead to a 
fall (rise) in the natural interest rate.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model for a 
closed economy without a government sector. The steady growth properties of the model 
are worked out and discussed. We define formally the LBT and determine the size of the 
inflation (or supply) and demand shocks that will push our economy into a LBT. Section 
3 contains the results of a simulation exercise that aims to determine the conditions under 
which an economy will get stuck in a LBT. Section 4 concludes.      7
2 THE  MODEL 
 
The equilibrium condition in the product market for a closed economy without a 
government sector when current output equals potential output is: 
                                                                I Y r s = ⋅ ) (                                                         (1) 
where s is the saving rate, Y  is potential output, and I is the (gross) level of investment. 
The real interest rate that results from (1) is the Wicksellian or natural interest rate r
n, 
i.e., the real interest rate that makes planned saving at potential output equal to planned 
investment. We believe it is better thought of as a long-term interest rate. If we denote by 
Y the level of output that keeps inflation constant at a given period in the absence of 
transitory inflation or supply shocks (hereafter INSs), we have that inflation will rise 
(fall) when  r r
n p  ( r r
n f ). This is the essential insight of the neo-Wicksellian approach 
to monetary policy (for a comprehensive presentation of this approach see Woodford 
2003).  
In addition to investment expenditure in productive capacity, we believe the most 
important regulation mechanism at work in modern market economies comes in the form 
of a CB that brings about changes in real interest rates so as to achieve an inflation target. 
We know that CBs can only set short-term nominal interest rates. Nevertheless, the 
presence of some inertia in the rate of inflation allows them to move real interest rates in 
the desired direction. The fact that the level of aggregate demand is a negative function of 
the real interest rate implies that CBs can, if nominal rates are above the ZB, set real 
interest rates so as to generate a level of aggregate demand that matches a given level of 
potential output. Let us present the following simple model: 
                                                           ) ( 1 r r f
n − = π &                                                          (2)    
                                                       ) ( 2 π π
d n f r r − = −                                                      (3) 
and substituting (3) into (2) yields: 
                                                         ) ( 3 π π π
d f − = &                                                          (4) 
where 0 ' 1 p f ,  0 ' 2 f f , 0 ' 3 p f , π  is the inflation rate, π
d  is the inflation target, and r is 
the current real interest rate. Differential equation (2) captures the dynamics of inflation 
in a neo-Wicksellian fashion. Equation (3) is a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. It can   8
be seen that—since  0 ' 3 p f —the rate of inflation will converge to π
d  in (4). Thus, as 
long as the policy rule is governed by (3), the CB will hit π
d . Nevertheless, CBs face 
several difficulties when implementing a rule like (3). Of critical importance to our study 
is that there may be circumstances when nominal short-term interest rates may already be 
at the ZB so the CB will be unable to vary real interest rates as dictated by expression (3). 
If so, the economy will exhibit an aggregate demand deficiency problem. This situation is 
usually referred to as a liquidity trap.
4  
Next, let’s consider a one-sector economy with two inputs, labor and capital, and 
assume that the aggregate production function has fixed coefficients. Potential output is 
defined as: 
                                                         K v N Y ⋅ ≤ ⋅ = λ                                                        (5) 
where N  is the level of employment that keeps inflation constant in the absence of INSs 
and λ  and v are, respectively, the productivity of labor and capital when the factors are 
fully utilized. The current rate of capacity utilization is: 





u                                                           (6) 
Thus, the rate of capacity utilization when  Y Y =  is: 





u ⋅ = =
λ
                                                    (7) 
where we define u  as the constant inflation rate of capacity utilization or CICU (see 
Corrado and Mattey 1997). We denote by e  the employment ratio corresponding to the 
constant inflation employment ratio or CIER and by L the labor force. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the CIER is constant.
5 Hence, we have that expression (7) can 
be reexpressed as: 
                                                 
4 A discussion of this problem in the context of a static model capturing the basic features of the NCV in 
macroeconomics is in Arestis and Sawyer (2003). For instance, they point out that “if the Central Bank 
could vary the rate of interest to ensure that savings and investment were continuously equated at levels 
that corresponded to a supply-side equilibrium (perhaps full employment), then there would be no deficient 
demand problem” (Arestis and Sawyer 2003). They identify a number of reasons why this may not be the 
case.  
 
5 In turn, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment or NAIRU is equal to  e − 1 . The assumption 
that the CIER is constant and supply-side determined is a necessary compromise given the desirability of 
restricting the complexity of the model.      9


















                                                 (8) 
where  L e N ⋅ = . In turn, the dynamics of the rate of inflation are given by:
6 
                                                              ) ( u u − =φ π &                  0 f φ                                (9) 
If we divide (1) through by the capital stock K and denote the rate of capital 
accumulation by g and the rate of depreciation of physical capital by ψ , we get: 
                                                 ψ + = ⋅ g
K
Y
s                                                       (10) 
and inserting (7) into (10) yields: 
                                                            ψ + = ⋅ ⋅ g u v s                                                      (11) 
The current real wage w/p is determined by firms’ profit maximization objectives:   
                                                  
m p
w λ
=                                                           (12) 
where w is the money wage, p is the price level, and  1 f m  is one plus the (average) 
markup. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the latter is constant. Finally, the 
“natural” rate of growth is:                                                
                                                              a l gn + =                                                             (13) 
where l and a are, respectively, the growth rate of labor force L and labor productivityλ .  
We now turn our attention to functions s and g. We assume that the saving rate (s) 
is a function of the rate of inflation (π ), the rate of growth of output ( y ˆ ), the real interest 
rate (r), and a measure of exogenous shocks (ε s) or:  
                                               ) , , ˆ , ( ε π s r y s s =                                                      (14) 
where we assume that  0 ˆ f sy ,  0 p sπ ,  0 f sr , and ε s is a stochastic variable with zero 
mean. The positive sign of sy ˆ  is based on the life cycle hypothesis of saving. The latter 
establishes a positive relation between s and  y ˆ  in the short and the long run (Modigliani 
and Brumberg 1980; Modigliani 1986). The positive sign of sr stems from the fact that, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 The assumed linearity and symmetry of the inflation dynamics equation is also a necessary compromise. 
The short-run output-inflation trade-off is likely to be non-linear, albeit the precise shape—concave versus 
convex—is a matter of controversy (see Filardo 1998).  
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although households are on average net lenders and substitution and income effects move 
in opposite directions for those individual households who are net lenders, wealth effects 
operate in the same direction as the substitution effect, thus making  0 ≤ sr  an unlikely 
scenario. The sign of sπ  requires some clarification. In a study by Pollin (1985), the 
author shows that the stability of the total outstanding debt ratio (St ) of the U.S. 
economy’s non-financial sectors has displayed essentially no trend throughout the post-
World War II period. Using the formula  Y Y q S t t ˆ / ) ˆ 1 ( + = , derived in Gurley and Shaw 
(1957), where qt  is the marginal propensity of the aggregate non-financial sector to issue 
net new debt and Y ˆ  is the rate of growth of nominal GNP, the author argues that the 
stability of St  throughout the postwar period, and especially since the 1960s, has resulted 
from rising trends for Y ˆ  and qt , coupled with a declining trend for the rate of growth of 
real GNP. As a result, the ratio  Y Y ˆ / ) ˆ 1 ( +  has fallen correspondingly over this period and 
qt  has risen along with Y ˆ  in order for St  to remain constant. According to Pollin (1985), 
the divergent patterns of St and qt  are due to the asymmetric impact of inflation on the 
two ratios. As for St , its numerator, the stock of debt, remains fixed in nominal terms 
regardless of variations in the price level (relative to trend), whereas its denominator, 
nominal GNP, varies in nominal terms directly with the price level. As a result, in an 
inflationary environment, the nominal value of the debt stock remains fixed while GNP 
rises, so that St  is biased downwards. Conversely, with qt , current period flow values 
are in both numerator and denominator, and thus, the impact of inflation on the ratio is 
neutral. Because of this asymmetry, an increasing reliance on debt by the non-financial 
sectors, i.e., a rising qt , may not engender increases in their debt burdens.  
Next, we have that for a given qt , a fall in the rate of inflation will increase net 
borrowers’ real debt burden and vice versa. In turn, this will increase the general level of 
bankruptcy risk. In the case of net borrower households, the increase in the real level of 
indebtedness will lead to a fall in consumption (Bernanke 1981). In the meantime, the 
increase in net borrowers’ real debt burden will be coupled by a rise in net lenders’ real 
financial wealth and, by the same token, this will tend to increase their consumption.   11
However, it is reasonable to assume that net borrowers’ marginal propensity to consume 
out of wealth is, on average, higher than net lenders’. In addition, the possibility of 
bankruptcy has an asymmetric impact on aggregate spending. This is because, as the 
level of bankruptcy risk rises (owing to rising real debt burdens by net borrowers), the 
level of spending of net lenders rises by less than the fall in the level of spending by net 
borrowers. Hence, we have that  0 p sπ . The size of sπ  will be proportional to the size of 
the aggregate debt ratio and the degree of dispersion of balance sheet positions across 
households.  
Next, let’s assume that firms have a desired rate of capacity utilization  1 p u
d , so 
they will expand capacity when  u u
d f  and stop expanding it when  u u
d p . A possible 
justification for this assumption is that firms prefer to keep some capacity idle in order to 
respond rapidly to unanticipated favorable demand shocks, as well as to deter the entry of 
potential rivals into the industry (Skott 1989). This assumption is equivalent to defining 
the rate of accumulation, (g) as: 
                                           ) , ( ε g
d u u f u v g − ⋅ ⋅ =                                               (15)             
where  0 f f u  is inversely proportional to the size of the lags affecting the construction 
and delivery of capital equipment,  0 ) 0 ( f f f = ,  0 ) ( = ε g E , and ε g  represents 
stochastic shocks affecting g. Parameter  f  plays an important role in this model. 
Formally, it is the ratio of the level of net investment to output when  u u
d = . More 
generally, it captures firms’ average expected future rate of growth of demand. Therefore, 
expression (11) can be rewritten as: 
                                   
u v




ε ε π + − = ) , ( ) , , ˆ , (                                     (16) 
Equation (16) represents the equilibrium condition in the product market when 
Y Y = . The value of r that fulfills this equilibrium condition is the natural interest rate. 
 
2.1  Steady Growth Analysis  
In steady growth, we have that  g y n = ˆ ,  u u u
d = = ,  π π
d = , and  0 = =ε ε g s , so that the two 
following conditions must hold:   12
                                                              g f u v n
d = ⋅ ⋅                                                       (17) 
and                                          ψ π + = ⋅ ⋅ g u v r g s n
d
n
d ) , , (
*                                              (18) 
  Equation (17) tells us that in steady growth the rate of accumulation must equal 
the “natural” rate of growth. Equation (18) is the counterpart to equation (16) for the 
steady growth case. In order to get an explicit solution for the steady growth real interest 
rate (r
*), we assume that function s adopts a linear form or: 
                                                    r s s y s s s r y ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = π π ˆ ˆ                                            (19)                               
where s  is a shift term determined by individuals’ preferences and institutional factors. 
Substituting (19) into (18) and rearranging we get: 
                                            
s






















π                                      (20) 
Thus, the steady growth real interest rate r
* is a function of the “natural” rate of 
growth, the target rate of inflation, the saving rate, the parameters of the saving function, 
the rate of depreciation, the technical capital output ratio, and the desired rate of capacity 
utilization. This result clearly runs against conventional wisdom since the latter poses that 
real variables are not affected by changes in nominal variables like the rate of inflation. 
Therefore, the model exhibits the property of nonneutrality of monetary policy in the long 
run. Finally, the steady growth real interest rate can also be interpreted as the real interest 
rate that is compatible with a neutral monetary policy in the long run. Hence, it represents 
a benchmark for the setting of interest rates for stabilization purposes. The steady growth 
properties of the model are: 













                                                  (21) 





















∂                                              (22) 











                                                   (23) 
   The positive sign of (21) is the result of the expansionary effect on the level of 
aggregate demand of an increase in the rate of inflation. In principle, the sign of (22) is 
ambiguous. However, it will be positive for reasonable values of the parameters. This can   13
be seen in Table 1, where we have that  7 0 , 1 /
* )
= ∂ ∂ g r n  for the combination of parameters 
derived from the calibration of the model. This means that a 1 percent fall in the “natural” 
rate of growth leads approximately to a 1 percent fall in r
* and vice versa. Table 1 also 
shows that  6 0 , 0 /
* )
= ∂ ∂ π
d r , so we have that a 1 percent fall in the target rate of inflation 
leads to a 0.06 percent fall in r
*. Admittedly, this is a negligible effect. However, the 
simulation exercise we performed showed that reducing sπ  tends to increase the stability 
of the system by making cyclical fluctuations more damped, so the actual value of sπ  is 
subject to some uncertainty. For instance, if we set  5 . 0 − = sπ , we have that  3 . 0 /
* )
= ∂ ∂ π
d r , 
so a 1 percent fall in the inflation target leads to a 0.3 percent fall in r
*. This suggests 
that changes in the rate of inflation probably have a small, albeit significant, impact on 
r
*. The negative sign of (23) reflects the fact that an increase in the saving rate reduces 
r
*. Finally, as the quotation above suggests, the NCV model assumes that 
g r s r n ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ − / /
* *  if  g d s d n = ―but only when causality runs from  gn to s ―and 
0 /
* = ∂ ∂ π
d r .  
Expression (22) also suggests that phenomena like the “New Economy,” whereby 
g n has allegedly increased due to the spread of information technology across the 
economy, has translated into a rise in r
*. As we argue below, this makes an economy less 
prone to getting stuck in a LBT and may also raise the CIER. More important to our 
discussion, it has been argued that the main cause of the stagnation experienced by the 
Japanese economy in the last decade is its high saving rate and low “natural” rate of 
growth (Krugman 1998; Nakatani and Skott 2006).
7 As expression (22) reflects, this 
hypothesis can be easily accommodated in our model so our results lend support to the 
views of those authors who argue that the Japanese economy was in a liquidity trap. This 
is because the low Japanese “natural” rate of growth, its high saving rate, and its low rate 
of inflation combine to yield a low and possibly negative steady growth interest rate. In a 
                                                 
7 According to these authors, the low Japanese “natural” rate of growth is the result of a negative rate of 
growth of labor force due to adverse demographic trends and a low rate of growth of productivity owing to 
the completion of the technological catch-up phase. Nakatani and Skott (2006) argue that the low “natural” 
growth rate generates a low profit share in national income and they refer to this situation as a “structural” 
liquidity trap.   
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2.2  The Behavior of the Economy in the Short Run 
Steady growth analysis is only valid for a long-run scenario in which the effects of 
shocks have already worked themselves out. The steady growth case also provides a 
position around which the economy will fluctuate. We now focus on the behavior of the 
economy in the short run. As we did with the saving rate, we assume that the investment 
function f  adopts a linear form or: 
                                                  ) ( ) , ( u u f f u u f
d
u g
d − ⋅ + = − ε                                        (24) 
where f  is a shift term capturing expectations on future demand growth. Substituting (24) 
into expression (16), we obtain the short-run equilibrium condition in the product market: 
                                   
u v
u f u f f r s s y s s
d
u u r y ⋅
+ ⋅ − ⋅ + = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
ψ
π π ˆ ˆ                      (25) 
and, as a result, the short-run rate of growth of output,  y ˆ  is: 
                                         
u v s s








⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + −
=
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ψ π π                            (26) 













                                                    (27) 













                                                   (28) 
  Hence, an increase in r will raise y ˆ , whereas an increase in π  will reduce it. 
Rearranging (25), we obtain the expression for the rate of interest that clears the product 
market in the short-run when  0 ˆ = y  and  g y n = ˆ , respectively, or: 
                                      
u v s s







− ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ +
=
= ψ π π 0 ˆ                          (29) 
                                                 
8 The competing explanation to the LBT in Japan is the “credit crunch” view. This explanation focuses on 
the contraction of the supply of credit (credit crunch) by Japanese banks in the 1990s caused by massive 
nonperforming loans accumulating in the financial system (Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 1997). However, we 
believe that this explanation can be incorporated in our model. As argued above, if banks restrain the flow 
of credit to the non-bank private sector, then aggregate demand and the natural interest rate will fall.       15
                                   
u v s s








⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ +
=
ψ π π ˆ                      (30) 
Expression (29) corresponds to point A in Figure 1 below. In expression (30), r
g  
is the rate of interest that yields  g y n = ˆ  for a given u and π . Therefore, the difference 
between r
g and r
* is that in the former it will generally not be the case that  π π
d =  and 
u u
d = . Setting  0 = r  in (26), we obtain point B in Figure 1 or: 
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Before we look at Figure 1, we need to analyze the impact of INSs and demand 
shocks (hereafter DSs) on r
g . As expression (32) below shows, unfavorable (favorable) 
INSs lead to a rise (fall) in r
g . In turn, expressions (33) and (34) show that favorable 
(unfavorable) DSs lead to a rise (fall) in r
g .  
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                                                     (34)        
The determination of r
g  is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. We measure the 
real interest rate (r) in the vertical axis and the rate of growth of output  y ˆ  in the 
horizontal one. The line denoting  y ˆ  for every value of r is downward-sloping, as stems 
from (27). We refer to it as the dynamic aggregate demand line or DAD line. In general, it 
will not be a line, owing to the presence of u and π  in expression (26). We impose on it 
the assumption of linearity for the sake of the argument. Its position is determined by the 
current rate of inflation and capacity utilization. Since  0 / f π ∂ ∂r
g , we have that an 
increase in inflation, from say π 0 to π1, shifts the DAD line upwards from DAD0 to 
DAD1, thereby leading to a rise in r
g . Similarly, a rise in  f  or a fall in s  will shift the 
DAD line upwards. We will return to Figure 1 after defining the LBT. 
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Next, we define the natural or neutral interest rate (r
n) as the real interest rate that 
yields a level of aggregate spending such that  u u = . It is clear from expression (35) 
below that r
n is a function of π ,  y ˆ ,  f , and s . An explicit solution of r
n can be 
obtained from (25) by setting  u u =  and rearranging: 
                      
s
s y s s
u v









π ⋅ − ⋅ − −
⋅
+ ⋅ − ⋅ +
=
ˆ ˆ
                         (35) 
  As expression (35) reflects, r
n depends on a wide range of factors, including the 
parameters of the saving and investment function, the rate of growth of output, capacity 
utilization, the inflation rate, and, importantly, the CICU. It is easy to see that an increase 
in s  or a fall in  f  associated with an increase in LP will push r
n downwards. By 
contrast, a rise in π  will push it upwards. At first sight, it may seem as if this   17
interpretation of liquidity preference (hereafter LP) leaves aside some insights of modern 
presentations of LPT, for example, the role played by banks in setting quantity 
constraints to credit (Moore 1988; Heise 1992; Wray 1992; Lavoie 1996; Wolfson 1996). 
Post Keynesian scholars have usually identified the concept of LP with an environment 
of fundamental uncertainty, where LP is inversely related to the degree of confidence, the 
reliability of beliefs, and Keynes’ animal spirits. For instance, an increase (fall) in the LP 
of banks will make them restrain (expand) the creation of credit money (and possibly to 
raise the loan rate vis á vis the cost of obtaining funds in wholesale money markets) 
which, in turn, will reduce aggregate demand. The crucial point for our argument is that 
the impact upon aggregate demand of this type of action will be akin to the effect in our 
model of an increase in s  or a fall in  f , in that it will push r
n downwards.   
Equation (35) also highlights that a change in the CICU will have an uncertain 
impact on r
n. This is because, for instance, a rise in the CICU leads―via equation 
(11)—to a rise in the rate of accumulation that may or may not be fully offset by an 
increase in the flow of saving at potential output.
9 We would like to make three 
considerations about this result. First, the former means that the potential presence of 
hysteresis in the CIER will have an uncertain impact on the likelihood that the economy 
is subject to the LBT constraint. This is because, in the presence of hysteresis, as the 
employment ratio falls, the CIER will follow suit, but this, in turn, may push r
n 
downwards or upwards. Second, it has been argued that the rise in productivity growth 
that occurred in the U.S. economy in the 1990s led to an increase in the CIER―or a fall 
in the NAIRU―owing to the slow adjustment process of workers’ wage aspirations to 
the higher productivity growth exhibited by the U.S. economy in that period (see Ball and 
Mankiw 2002). This process might have operated in the opposite direction in Japan, so it 
is possible that as Japanese productivity growth slowed down in the 1990s, its CIER and 
hence, its CICU, fell, thus leading to a fall in r
n. This story is consistent with the 
Japanese stagnation and the stationary tendencies exhibited by the Japanese inflation rate 
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in the same period despite rising registered (and hidden) unemployment.
10 In the case of 
the United States, it may be that a rising CIER led to a higher r
n. As argued in Ball and 
Tchaidze (2002), the failure of the Fed to raise the federal funds rate in response to 
falling unemployment is explained by a decrease in the NAIRU in the late 1990s. As they 
show (see their figure 1 in particular), the stationary federal funds rate, coupled with a 
slight downward trend of the inflation rate in that period, resulted in the real federal funds 
rate exhibiting an upward trend which is consistent with a higher r
n. Be that as it may, 
and this is our third consideration, these phenomena cannot be explained by the NCV 
model which predicts that changes in the “natural” rate of growth or in potential output 
affect neither the CIER nor the natural interest rate. This is because, as implied by the 
quotation of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) in the introduction, a rise in potential 
output raises output demand in a perfectly offsetting manner due to the impact of 
permanent income which, in turn, implies that changes in the CIER do not affect the 
natural interest rate. In any case, conventional wisdom has it that a rise in the CIER―or a 
fall in the NAIRU―will be associated with a fall rather than a rise in the natural interest 
rate and vice versa, since a higher CIER represents a larger flow of aggregate saving at 
(higher) potential output that, in principle, is not compensated by higher investment 
demand.  
 
2.3  The Lower-bound Trap (LBT) 
We now seek to provide a formal and general definition of a LBT on real interest rates. 
We distinguish between two different types of LBT: the growth lower-bound trap 
(GLBT) and the conventional lower-bound trap (CLBT).  
 
                                                 
10 As shown in Kuttner and Posen (2001), with the exception of a brief respite in 1997 (in large part due to 
an increase in the consumption tax) inflation, as measured by the Japanese GDP deflator, was consistently 
negative between 1994 and 2001, but failed to exhibit a clear downward trend. One reason for this behavior 
of the Japanese inflation rate is provided in Yellen and Akerlof (2004) who argue that the evidence 
suggests a diminished tendency for inflation to fall in the face of high unemployment due to a lower pass-
through of inflationary expectations into inflation once inflation is already low. They also blame  
downward nominal wage rigidity for this effect. In this respect, Mourougane and Ibaragi (2004) estimate 
Phillips curves for Japan and find strong evidence that at low or negative inflation rates, indicators of 
demand pressure have no statistically significant effect on price inflation. This implies that a more realistic 
presentation of equation (9) above would be to set a lower value for its parameter when u is below the 
CICU than when it is above.  
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2.3.1  The Growth Lower-bound Trap (GLBT) 
If we denote by ω  the minimum (ex-ante) real interest rate that a CB can set, we can 
define a GLBT on real interest rates as a situation where: 
                                                       ω p r
g                                                            (36)    
If we think of r as a short-term real interest rate, then it is reasonable to assume 
that the minimum nominal interest rate the CB can set is zero. However, if we think of r 
as a long-term interest rate, then the minimum nominal interest rate the CB can set will 
be positive. This is because investors require a (time-varying) term premium,  0 f μ , to 
purchase long-dated securities.
11 We believe that the size of μ  is mainly determined by 
the LP of investors. If we also assume that the expected rate of inflation is equal to the 
current inflation rate we have: 
                                                          π μ π μ ω − = − =
e                                                (37)                               
Therefore, we will say that an economy is in a GLBT if: 
                                                                μ π p + r
g                                                         (38) 
  This corresponds to the case illustrated in Figure 1 above. The horizontal line 
denotes the value of ω  for a rate of inflation π 0. Hence, the economy will be in a GLBT 
insofar as  ω π μ = − 0 p r
g . As a result, we have that  g y n p ˆ  and either an initially 
positive output gap will narrow or a negative one will widen. Likewise, if the economy is 
in a GLBT, we will observe that the unemployment rate exhibits an upward trend despite 
short-term nominal interest rates being stuck at zero.
12 This scenario fits well in Japan’s 
recent experience since, as shown in Orphanides (2004), its rate of unemployment rose 
steadily from about 2 percent in 1990 to more than 5 percent in 2002. But this increase in 
                                                 
11  We may note that the nominal rate of return on long-dated securities is determined by an average of the 
current and expected future short-term nominal interest rates plus the term premium required by 
investors—which will be positive—so that, in principle, the difference between the nominal return of long-
dated and short-dated securities will have an uncertain sign. However, when short-term nominal interest 
rates are already at zero, the yield curve cannot be downward-sloping because expected future short-term 
nominal interest rates will be at or above zero, so the difference between long-term and short-term real 
interest rates is well approximated by the term premium required by investors.    
   
12 If an economy has been in a GLBT for a relatively long period, one would expect that it exhibits a large 
(negative) output gap. In this respect, Krugman (1998) argues that the negative output gap the Japanese 
economy exhibited in the late 1990s was largely underestimated in official statistics. He adds that it could 
have been as large as 8 per cent of GDP and it may have grown much larger since 1998. Kuttner and Posen 
(2001) make a similar point and provide estimates of the Japanese output gap. 
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registered unemployment does not tell us the whole story, since hidden unemployment 
was also on the rise in Japan (see Nakatani and Skott 2006).      
Next, a favorable INS will push the economy into a GLBT if:  












p                                                    (39) 
where the subscript in π  and r
g denotes the initial values of these variables. Finally, an 
unfavorable DS due, for instance, to a rise in s , will push the economy into a GLBT if: 







∂ + − + μ π                                                (40) 
  An economy that finds itself in a GLBT may not necessarily be stuck in a CLBT. 
In fact, if the employment ratio is decreasing (increasing) but is still above (below) the 
CIER, the rate of inflation will keep rising (falling), at least for some time. Therefore, the 
notion of the GLBT allows us to understand the circumstances under which the CB will 
be unable to prevent the employment ratio from falling and which type of shock may pull 
the economy out of that scenario. We now look at the circumstances under which the CB 
will not be able to prevent the inflation rate from falling in the absence of adverse INSs.  
 
2.3.2   The Conventional Lower-bound Trap (CLBT) 
We define a CLBT as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become 
impotent because nominal interest rates are at or near zero. In turn, this will be the case 
when desired saving exceeds desired investment at the CIER, even at a zero short-term 
nominal interest rate or  ω p r
n . If an economy gets stuck in a CLBT, the rate of capacity 
utilization will be lower than the CICU and inflation will fall steadily in the absence of 
adverse INSs.
13 A CLBT represents a situation of involuntary unemployment in the sense 
that money wage cuts will not help the economy reduce the unemployment rate. Indeed, 
in these circumstances, money wage cuts and, more generally, downward price 
flexibility, may make matters even worse by setting off a deflationary spiral. This is 
because once the short-term nominal interest rate is zero, additional reductions in the rate 
                                                 
13 Of course, even if  ω f r
n , there is still the possibility that a CB sets real interest rates above the natural 
interest rate in order to generate a disinflation process.  
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of inflation will push up real interest rates further reducing aggregate demand. Assuming 
that expected inflation equals current inflation, we say that an economy is in a CLBT if: 
                                 μ π p + r
n                                                          (41) 
 Expression  (41)  tells us that the lower r
n and π  are, the more likely it is that the 
economy gets stuck in a CLBT in the wake of favorable INSs or unfavorable DSs. Thus, 
setting an inflation target that is close to zero increases the probability that the economy 
gets in a CLBT. In contrast to recent discussions in the literature, expressions (38) and 
(41) also highlight that a negative r
g or r
n—due, for instance, to a high saving rate or  
pessimistic expectations about future demand growth—or a high μ  are as potentially 
dangerous as the setting of a very low inflation target.
14  
Conventional wisdom regarding the ZB trap on nominal interest rates seems to be 
that the latter may arise as a result of unusually large adverse DSs or favorable INSs in a 
very low inflation environment. It also holds that this is a very unlikely scenario, as long 
as target (measured) inflation is at or above 2 percent (Fuhrer and Madigan 1997; De 
Long 1999). However, the literature tends to sidestep the fact that, as expressions (38) 
and (41) reflect, an economy may get into a LBT even if inflation is not very low, i.e., if 
r
n is low or negative andμ  is high. In turn, a low or negative r
n will be the result of a 
high saving rate, a low “natural” rate of growth, or a combination of them.  
Finally, expressions (38) and (41) also suggest that a possible escape route from a 
LBT is the creation of inflationary expectations, as proposed in Krugman (1998) and 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). However, as long as expected inflation tracks current 
inflation, there is no clear way through which a CB can overcome the so-called “inverted 
credibility” problem.
15 The experience of disinflation episodes of OECD economies in 
the last two decades suggests that inflation expectations closely track current inflation. As 
a result, CBs can only raise inflationary expectations by generating inflation and they 
                                                 
14 In the context of an open economy with a government sector, a low or negative natural interest rate may 
also be the result of either a large government surplus or a large current account deficit.  
 
15 Krugman (1998) argues that if a CB can credibly commit to pursue inflation and ratify inflation when it 
comes, it should be able to increase inflationary expectations despite the absence of any traction on the 
economy by means of conventional monetary policy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) present a more fully 
dynamic analysis of the problem. To them, a commitment to create subsequent inflation is presented as a 
commitment to keep interest rates low for some time in the future.  
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cannot generate it as long as the economy remains stuck in a LBT.
16 Therefore, in the 
absence of unconventional monetary policy options, only expansionary fiscal policy or 
substantial improvements in the current account balance will kick start the economy.
17 
We now turn to the analysis of the behavior of the natural interest rate in the 
aftermath of INSs and DSs and to a quantitative assessment of the likelihood that an 
economy be driven to a LBT in the aftermath of INSs and DSs. Differentiating (36) and 
rearranging we obtain: 
                                 
s
f d s d y d s d s
r d
r
y n + − ⋅ − ⋅ −
=
ˆ ˆ π π                                       (42) 
If we initially set  0 ˆ = = = f d s d y d  then (42) becomes: 
                                                 π d r d
n ⋅ Π = 0                                                       (43) 





= Π .  
                                                 
16 As pointed out by Blinder (2000), “the problem, in a word, is that such a policy pronouncement will not 
be credible once a country is already in the soup.” The words of Kazuo Ueda at the 1999 JMCB 
Conference in Woodstock (Vermont) may serve to summarize the difficulties faced by a CB once the ZB 
on nominal rates binds: “Don’t put yourself in the position of zero interest rates. You’ll have to face a lot of 
difficulties. I can tell you it will be a lot more painful than you can possibly imagine” (Ueda 2000).  
 
17 A number of authors have recently analyzed the likelihood of economies getting stuck in a LBT, as well 
as the policy options that will remove this constraint in case the economy gets there. Two recent Journal 
Symposiums have been devoted to this issue; the 2000 Symposium on “Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower 
Bound” published in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking and the 2004 Symposium on “Policies to 
Deal with Deflation” in the American Economic Review. A summary of the former is in Blinder (2000) and 
an evaluation of the different proposals is in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). There seems to be an emerging 
consensus on the view that the mere existence of a ZB on nominal interest rates can engender a moderate 
deterioration in macroeconomic stability as the inflation target approaches zero so that it represents an 
important constraint on how monetary policy operates in a low inflation environment (Fuhrer and Madigan 
1997; Reifschneider and Williams 2000; Mussa 2000). In particular, studies find that there is trade-off 
between the average rate of inflation and the variability of the output gap so that the latter increases as the 
rate of inflation approaches zero and becomes negative (see Orphanides and Wieland 1998). One aspect 
these studies address is the possibility that the economy enters a deflationary spiral once the ZB binds. The 
usual verdict is that this type of episode is very rare and thus, it should not be a matter of concern. Yet, they 
recommend that CBs set a low, but positive, inflation target (preferably 2 per cent). Conversely, there is no 
emerging consensus as to whether unconventional monetary policy options can take the economy out of a 
CLBT should it be necessary. Several policy options for CBs to deal with it have been proposed (see 
Goodfriend 2000, 2001; Clouse et al. 2000; McCallum 2000; Svensson 2001; Yates 2002; Buiter 2003; Ito 
and Mishkin 2004; Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack 2004). However, as emphasized in Reifschneider and 
Williams (2000) “the likely effectiveness of such actions is unclear from a theoretical perspective, and they 
have never been put to a definitive test.” Only expansionary fiscal policy tends to be supported as the most 
reliable weapon in a liquidity trap (see, in particular, Kuttner and Posen 2001).   
   23
Thus, INSs per se induce changes of r
n in the same direction as current inflation, 
so r
n will move in a destabilizing fashion. As a result, any CB-induced change in real 
interest rates will be less effective in affecting output and inflation than if r
n remained 
constant. If we retrieve expression (41), we may conclude that, in the absence of changes 
in y ˆ , the economy will get stuck into a CLBT in the wake of a favorable INS ( 0 p π d ) if: 






− + − μ π π r d
n
p                                                    (44) 
It is clear from (44) that, in the absence of changes in y ˆ  and for given values of 
π 0, r
n
0, and μ , the likelihood that the economy gets stuck into a CLBT is proportional to 
the magnitude of the initial INS ( π d ) and the size of Π0. If we use the values of the 
parameters obtained from the calibration of the model (see Table 1 below), assuming that 
02 . 0 0 = π  and μ = 0.01, and taking the value of r
* in Table 1 as a proxy for r
n
0, we have 
that Π0= 0.06 so the minimum size of a favorable INS that will push the economy into a 
CLBT is equal to –3.73 percentage points. Admittedly, such a favorable INS is extremely 
unlikely. However, an increase in sy ˆ, s , or μ , or a fall in  gn will reduce this value 
significantly. For instance, if  015 . 0 = gn , we have that  003 . 0
* = r  and so the minimum 
size becomes as low as –1.2 percentage points.  
In a closed economy without a government sector, DSs initially affect r
n through 
their direct impact on s or g. For the sake of convenience, we restrict the analysis to the 
case of shocks affecting s  ( 0 ≠ s d ). Notwithstanding, results are qualitatively similar for 
shocks affecting g ( 0 ≠ f d ). If we set  0 ˆ = = = f d y d dπ  in (42) we obtain: 
                                                  s d r d






= Π . 
Expression (45) tells us that the impact on r
n of a shock to the saving rate when  
0 ˆ = = = f d y d dπ  is proportional to Π1. Since Π1 is negative, we have that the behavior 
of r
n will also be destabilizing. If condition (41) does not hold, then the minimum size of 
the variation in the real interest rate ( r Δ ) required to offset a shock to s  is: 
                                           s d r r r
n ⋅ Π + − = Δ 1 0 0 ) (                                                (46)   24
where r0 is the initial current real interest rate. In turn, the economy will get stuck into a 
CLBT in the wake of an adverse DS ( 0 f s d ) if: 




0 0 ) ( μ π r s d
n
f                                                   (47) 
  If we make use of the values of the parameters derived from the calibration of the 
model we have that, assuming that  02 . 0 0 = π  and μ = 0.01 and taking the value of r
* as 
a proxy for r
n
0, we have that Π1= –0.6, so the minimum rise in s  required to push the 
economy into a CLBT is equal to 0.066 and this value gets as low as 0.021 if  = gn 0.015. 
Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the values of the parameters, these 
results suggest, as a minimum, the need to complement monetary policy with counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. To be sure, if the economy gets stuck in a LBT, then a sufficiently 
large increase in the government budget deficit will raise both r
n and r
g , thus allowing 
monetary policy to push the economy out of the LBT.  
 
3 QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS 
 
Appendix B presents the details of a simulation exercise aimed at calibrating the model 
presented in Section 2 above. In that exercise, we assign plausible values to the 
parameters of the model so as to compute the multipliers and partial derivatives obtained 
in Section 2, as well as the operators used in Section 3. In this case, plausible values are a 
set of values that coincide with the values found in empirical studies when the latter are 
available or else a set of values that render the model stable. In order to evaluate the 
behavior of the economy in the presence of a ZB on nominal interest rates, we first need 
to specify the monetary policy rule. For the sake of the argument, we assume that the CB 
knows the steady growth interest rate (r
*) and that the (long-term) real interest rate is 
determined according to the following rule:
18  
                                                 
18 Although CBs can only set short-term interest rates, it is only a short step forward to assume that they 
also set long-term interest rates if the term premium and investors expectations on future short-term interest 
rates are constant.   
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where α  is the inflation gap response coefficient of the CB policy rule.   
Therefore, the real interest rate is determined by a Taylor-type rule as long as the 
ZB does not bind or else is equal to the difference between the term premium and the 
inflation rate. Figures 2 through 5 below show the time path of the inflation rate, capacity 
utilization, the CICU, the current and natural interest rate, and the CLBT condition 
( 0 p μ π − + r
n ). It can be seen that, for the set of parameter values reported in Table 1 
below, the economy exhibits damped oscillations and converges to the singular point, P
*
1 
(see Appendix A for a derivation of the singular points of the dynamical system). It can 
be seen in Figure 5 that the CLBT condition exhibits cyclical oscillations with more 
amplitude than either the natural or the current interest rate. The time paths of the natural 
and current real interest rate are remarkably similar so they cannot be distinguished from 
each other in practice. This suggests that the high volatility exhibited by the natural 
interest rate makes it extremely difficult for CBs to use it in practice as a benchmark for 
setting real interest rates.
19 
Importantly, the simulation exercise revealed that increases in the saving rate or 
the term premium and/or reductions in the “natural” rate of growth or the inflation target 
increase the vulnerability of the system. In other words, they increase the likelihood that 
the economy gets stuck in a LBT. When this is the case, the economy collapses abruptly. 
This is due to the fact that when the economy hits a LBT and the output gap is negative, 
the rate of inflation keeps falling, thus pushing real interest rates further up. In turn, the 
rise in the real interest rate increases the size of the (negative) output gap further, thereby 
                                                 
19 In addition, its volatility finds support in recent studies. For instance, in a study by Laubach and Williams 
(2001), the natural rate of interest is estimated using quarterly data for the United States over the period 
1961 to 2000. In all the model specifications displayed, the authors find substantial variations in its 
estimated value throughout that period. For instance, in the baseline specification, the minimum value of 
the natural interest rate is found to be as low as 1.28 percent, whereas the maximum value is found to be 
4.52 percent. In addition, the authors concede there is sizeable uncertainty around most of their estimates of 
the natural rate of interest, the trend growth rate, and potential output so the actual variation could be much 
larger. Crespo Cuaresma, Gnan, and Ritzberger-Grünwald (2005) provide a comprehensive survey of 
international natural rate of interest estimates. 
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setting off a deflationary spiral.
20 For instance, for the set of parameter values reported in 
Table 1, the economy fell apart or diverged gradually from the steady growth position if 
0138 . 0 p gn . This value rises to 0.017 if  015 . 0 = μ . Similarly, the economy collapses if 
142 . 0 f s , but this value falls to 0.135 if  015 . 0 = μ . Finally, the economy collapses if 
038 . 0 f μ , but this value gets as low as 0.012 if  015 . 0 = gn . However, these results were 
obtained for the initial conditions reported in Table 1. They may change considerably if 
the initial conditions differ markedly from those reported. In general, the closer the initial 
conditions for u, u , and π  are to point P
*
1, the less likely it is that the economy gets 




This study attempted to integrate in a simple theoretical framework the notion of the 
natural or neutral interest rate, liquidity preference theory, and monetary policy practice 
by modern CBs in order to analyze the conditions under which an economy will exhibit 
an aggregate demand deficiency problem. We argued that a CB will be able to prevent 
this scenario if the economy is not stuck in a lower-bound trap (LBT) and showed that 
this will be the case when the difference between the natural or neutral interest rate and 
the term premium required by investors is higher than the rate of inflation with a negative 
sign. Liquidity preference plays an important role in this framework since it affects the 
natural interest rate, as well as the term premium. We also argued that the predictions of 
the model broadly support the hypothesis that the Japanese economy has been in a LBT 
for almost a decade. This is because an implication of our analysis is that “structural” 
factors, like a high saving rate or a low “natural” rate of growth, increase the likelihood 
that a LBT on real interest rates binds. Our results stand in contrast to the New Consensus 
                                                 
20 As recognized in Reifschneider and Williams (2000), this type of result holds for almost any 
macroeconomic model in which: 1) monetary policymakers influence aggregate demand primarily through 
changes in real short-term interest rates and 2) inflation displays significant inertia. To avoid a catastrophic 
collapse in (stochastic) simulation resulting from these deflationary episodes, they make allowance in the 
formation of expectations for the possibility of emergency fiscal stimulus in cases of persistent periods of 
zero rates. The stimulus is assumed to be of sufficient magnitude to offset the effect of the ZB until the 
economy recovers.  
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View model in macroeconomics which predicts that a LBT may only occur as a result of 
unusually large shocks in a very low inflation environment.  
Although we did not address the mainstream literature on the policy options to 
take an economy out of a liquidity trap, our analysis suggests that counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy is still the most reliable tool. Another prediction of our model that runs against 
conventional wisdom is that an increase in the NAIRU may involve a fall, rather than a 
rise, in the natural interest rate and vice versa. We claimed that this prediction is 
consistent with the experiences of the United States and Japan in the 1990s. In any case, 
the implications of this result are far reaching and could not be discussed at length in this 
study. Finally, the most obvious limitation of our framework is the (assumed) exogeneity 
of the NAIRU and the “natural” rate of growth. Hence, a future development of this 
paper is to study the impact on our results of the interaction between the former two 
variables and the level of aggregate demand.          28
APPENDIX A:  COMPUTATION OF SINGULAR POINTS 
In order to compute the singular points of the model presented in Section 2, we need to 
rewrite expression (3) in linear form or:                                                             
                                                        ) (
* π π α
d r r − + =                                                     (49) 
where  0 f α  is the response coefficient of monetary policy to changes in the inflation 
gap; we assume for simplicity that the CB knows r
*. This policy rule implies that 
policymakers respond in a systematic and symmetric fashion to deviations of inflation 
from target. By definition, we have that: 





                                                          (50) 
and substituting (24) and (26) into (50) yields: 
                                                               ) , ( π u h u = &                                                          (51) 
  Next, if we take logarithms in (8) and differentiate it with respect to time we get: 
                                                            ) ( g g u u n − ⋅ = &                                                      (52) 
and substituting (24) into (15) and then into (52) yields: 
                                            [ ] )) ( ( u u f f u v g u u
d
u n − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ = &                                  (53) 
Therefore, our dynamical system is made up of differential equations (9), (51), 
and (53). For convenience, we assume that  ) / ( u v g f
d
n ⋅ = , as stems from expression 
(17). We can then obtain the singular points of the system made up of equations (9), (51), 
and (53) by setting  0 = = = u u & & & π  which, in turn, yields the two following singular 
points: 
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where the only singular point with economic meaning is:
21 
                                                 ) , , (
*
1 u u P
d d d π =  
                                                 
21 The second singular point given the values assigned to the parameters and reported in Table 1 above is: 
) 5 . 2 ; 5 . 2 ; 36 . 0 (
*
2 − − − = P .   29
APPENDIX B:  NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
 
The numerical simulation exercise was aimed at calibrating the model presented in 
Section 2. This exercise allowed us to compute the multipliers, operators, and partial 
derivatives obtained in previous sections. Table 1 reports the values of the operators 
computed for the formal analysis, as well as the values for r
*,  f ,  g r n ∂ ∂ /
* ,  π
d r ∂ ∂ /
* ,  
s r ∂ ∂ /
* ,  ψ ∂ ∂ /
* r , and  α ∂ Δ ∂ / 4 . It also reports the value of α
*, i.e., the minimum value 
of the response coefficient of the monetary policy rule of the CB that makes the system 
stable. Figures 2 through 5 show the time path of all the variables in the dynamic model 
for the values of the parameters reported in Table 1. The parameter values were chosen 
according to the values reported in the empirical literature. For instance, the long-run 
inflation target for many CBs is 2 percent. The empirical literature usually finds that the 
technical output capital ratio (v) is about 0.3. Some empirical studies for the U.S. 
economy suggest that the CICU is about 82 percent (Corrado and Mattey 1997). The 
value assigned to φ  stems from results reported in McElhattan (1985), who finds that for 
each percentage point that capacity utilization exceeds 82 percent, inflation accelerates by 
about 0.15 percentage points. The resulting value for r
* is less than half a percentage 
point above the average value for the real federal funds rate over the 1960–1998 period in 
the United States: 2.55 percent (Reifschneider and Williams 2000). Finally, the values of 
the parameters in the saving rate and investment function were chosen so as to render the 
model stable and, for the sake of convenience, we set  f  equal to its steady growth value.       30
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 1: Values of the parameters, initial conditions, operators, and partial derivatives 
05 . 0 = f u   5 . 1 ˆ = sy   5 . 0 = α   8 . 0 0 = u   7 0 . 1 /
* )
= ∂ ∂ g r n  
8 . 0 = u
d   015 . 0 = ψ   6 ˆ 0 . 0
* = α   0412 . 0 1 − = Δ   6 0 . 0 /
* )
= ∂ ∂ π
d r  
02 . 0 = π
d   3 . 0 = v   125 . 0 = f   00205 . 0 2 − = Δ   6 . 0 /
* − = ∂ ∂ s r  
1 . 0 = s   15 . 0 = φ   6 029 . 0
* )
= r   052 . 0 3 = Δ   7 019 . 0 /
* )
− = ∂ ∂ s r r  
1 . 0 − = sπ   03 . 0 = gn   03 . 0 0 = π   00078 . 0 4 = Δ   6 0 . 0 0
)
= Π  
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Fig. 5: Current and natural real interest rate and CLBT condition ( μ π − + r
n ) 
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